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Abstract
This article examines Indonesia’s reactions towards regional haze management eﬀ orts 
between October 2006 and September 2007. Two signifi cant developments occurred 
during this time, drawing att ention to Indonesia’s sovereignty sensitivities. Firstly, while 
Indonesia at fi rst seemed to be moving towards ratifi cation of the ASEAN Agreement 
on Transboundary Haze Pollution, it abruptly decided to set up a special committ ee 
to study the treaty, eﬀ ectively halting the parliamentary ratifi cation process. Secondly, 
aft er asking for regional help by inviting ASEAN member countries to assist areas of 
their choosing, Indonesia later refused to approve their proposals. The article argues 
that Indonesia is reluctant to give up control over its sovereignty due to the shadow of 
a bloody colonial history, bitt er foreign interventionist experiences, territorial disputes 
with its neighbours, and ongoing internal confl icts,. External non-intervention is 
especially important to Indonesia now, in the process of decentralizing and dealing 
with the arising internal complications, especially those involving forest resources. The 
paper concludes that these developments could be part of a bigger att empt by Indonesia 
to regain its past glory as the de facto leader of ASEAN, enabling it to use its infl uence to 
strengthen the non-interference principle to protect its sovereignty during the delicate 
decentralization process. 
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INTRODUCTION
There exists signifi cant literature on the Southeast Asian haze from perspectives both within 
and outside the region. Very litt le however has been writt en on Indonesia’s thinking and 
response towards the regional haze problem. Marinova (1999) and Mayer (2006) provide 
a good overview of the haze crisis, with Marinova discussing causational factors, and 
Mayer detailing responses of both ASEAN and individual states. Cott on (1999), Funston 
(1999, 1998) and Ramcharan (2000) focus on ASEAN’s patt erns of regional engagement, in 
particular non-intervention, and how this might have aﬀ ected haze management. Chang 
and Rajan (2001) in turn compare regional and multilateral approaches. Florano has 
writt en several pieces on ASEAN haze agreements. In 2004, he examined the contents of 
the 1997 ASEAN Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP). His 2003 content-analytical study 
compared and contrasted the texts of the ATHP and Europe’s Convention for Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution using Pamela Chasek’s ‘Strength Index’. Here he 
concludes that the ATHP appears, in theory, to be stronger than the CLRTAP but is weak 
in compliance and punishment mechanisms.
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This article aims to contribute to the literature by concentrating on the Indonesian 
response to ASEAN’s various att empts at managing the regional haze. The article att empts 
to explain Indonesia’s reactions through analysis of its present and past domestic issues, 
while taking to account Indonesia’s unique position within the association. As the major 
source of the pollution, a bett er understanding of Indonesia’s place in the regional haze 
equation would be a useful contribution towards the larger picture of regional pollution 
management. 
Cause and Eﬀ ect
Extensive forest and grass fi res, mostly in Indonesia, leading to smoke pollution have 
become regular events in the Southeast Asian region. With particular atmospheric 
conditions, this ‘haze’ has persisted for long periods. Previous episodes were in 1982-
83, 1987, 1991, and 1994, but that of 1997-98 and 2006 was more extreme, costly, and 
in some localities; life-threatening (Cott on 1999). In 1997-1998, about 10 million hectares 
were burned (Mayer 2006). The El Niño Seasonal Oscillation (ENSO) produces the dry 
conditions which make fi res in normally moist rainforest terrain possible (Cott on 1999). 
However, El Niño does not start fi res (Marinova 1999). For some time, the major cause 
of these fi res were ascribed to the practice of small-scale agriculture, which in dry years 
have led to deliberately set small fi res spreading out of control. However, recent evidence 
has shift ed the blame from forest-dwelling populations mainly to the activities of large 
commercial operations (Cott on 1999). 
Firstly, the granting of excessive timber ‘concessions’ and the poor policing of mandatory 
selective logging and reforestation regulations give litt le incentive to adhere to fi re 
prevention policies. The resulting disrupted forest canopy exaggerates the drying of the 
forest in dry seasons. Secondly, logged areas are oft en converted into timber or oil palm 
plantations, a program which has received government support in Indonesia. Burning is 
the cheapest and easiest method to clear the land needed. Thirdly, the clearing of land has 
also been linked to transmigration programs that require deforested areas for sett lement 
(Cott on 1999). Fourth is the draining of peat swamps (a good form of carbon sinks) for 
rice cultivation. Dried peat burns easily, and as the fi res sometimes extend to deposits 
deep underground, rainfall does not always put them out (Cott on 1999). The smoke 
produced contains the highest concentration of pollutants, though Indonesia did not 
acknowledge this contribution during the 1997-98 crisis. In all, Indonesia’s commitment 
to an obviously an unsustainable exploitation of its timber resources is a major factor in 
this environmental crisis (Cott on 1999). 
The haze caused repeated emergencies in Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia itself, 
and to some extent Thailand and the Philippines (see Figure 1) (Mayer 2006). A reading of 
above 100 PSI (Pollutants Standard Index) is ‘unhealthy’ and in excess of 300, ‘hazardous’. 
While reliable data is not available from Indonesia, Singapore and Peninsula Malaysia 
recorded a PSI of 140 in September 1997. In East Malaysia, a PSI of 849 was recorded in 
Kuching in October 1997, bringing most outdoor activities to a halt. It is estimated that 
readings of over 1000 must have been common in parts of Indonesia close to the source 
(Cott on 1999).
The 1997-98 haze aﬀ ected the health of some 75 million people, and the economies of six 
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) members (Mayer 2006). According to 
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the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), the forest fi res in 1997 cost the region US$494 
million in timber losses, US$470 million in agriculture, US$1.8 billion in direct and 
indirect forest benefi ts, US$30 million in capturable biodiversity, US$25 million for fi re-
fi ghting, and US$272 million in carbon releases. It also caused US$ 941 million in short-
term damage to health. It damaged industrial production by US$157 million and fi sheries 
by US$16 million. It set back tourism by US$256 million and infl icted US$24.7 million in 
losses on airports and airlines, and also caused several airline crash tragedies (Severino 
1999). 
ASEAN Response
As the haze wrought dramatic damage, many looked to ASEAN to respond (Severino 
1999). Regional initiatives began with the 1992 Bandung Conference, and workshops 
in Indonesia and Malaysia in 1992-95. At the Sixth ASEAN Senior Oﬃ  cials of the 
Environment Meeting in 1995, a Haze Technical Task Force (HTTF) was established. While 
the objective of the HTTF was to operationalize and implement the measures stated in the 
1995 ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution, no substantive action was 
taken (Chang & Rajan 2001). It was only in the aft ermath of the severe 1997 haze that 
regional policymakers seem to awaken to the need for regional cooperation. The Regional 
Haze Action Plan (RHAP) was the result of this renewed eﬀ ort (Chang & Rajan 2001). It 
was a soft -law, non-binding international instrument, approved for implementation by 
the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze without going through the tedious process of 
national ratifi cation required by the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It 
stood on three pillars: the spirit of voluntarism, the no-fault-fi nding rule, and the oﬀ er of 
assistance based on expertise and capability (Florano 2004). 
The RHAP generated a massive amount of information on the haze (Severino 1999) but 
not much else. In 2002 the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (ATHP) 
was proposed. This was a legally-binding regional treaty, providing for legal support to 
the RHAP upon ratifi cation by at least six countries (Florano 2003). In 2003, it became the 
fi rst legally binding ASEAN regional environmental agreement to be entered into force 
(ASEAN 2007). Today, Indonesia and the Philippines are the only member countries that 
have not yet ratifi ed the treaty (Morning Star Online 8 October 2006). The treaty enshrines 
sovereignty over natural resources, neighbourliness, international cooperation, the 
precautionary principle, and sustainable development. It relies on the cooperation of its 
parties through self-regulation and decentralized operations (Florano 2003). 
NON-INTERFERENCE IN ASEAN AND INDONESIA
The concept of non-interference is one of the fundamental principles which guide the 
relations of ASEAN member nations with each other. This concept was formalized within 
the signing of its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in 1976. 
Article 2 of the treaty binds members to practice ‘non-interference in the internal aﬀ airs 
of one another’ and recognizes ‘the right of every state to lead its national existence free 
from external interference’ (ASEAN 2008). Other ASEAN documents that enshrine this 
principle include the Bangkok Declaration and the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality 
Declaration (Katanyuu 2006). The non-interference principle fi rstly discourages member 
states from criticizing or intervening in members’ internal aﬀ airs. Second, it commits 
members to deny sanctuary and support to groups seeking to subvert or overthrow the 
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governments of member states. Third, it discouraged members from providing external 
powers with any form of support deemed subversive to other members (Katanyuu 
2006).
The non-interference policy owed much of its origin to confl icts involving Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines in the early 1960s, before the establishment of ASEAN. 
Indonesia and the Philippines had opposed the creation of an independent Malaysia that 
would include Sabah, Sarawak and Brunei, due to their own territorial, sovereignty and 
great-power concerns. This so-called ‘confrontation’ involved Indonesia’s aggressive acts 
against Malaysia, by sponsoring low-level military incursions and providing training and 
support to subversive groups. Adding towards the distrust between neighbours was the 
role of powers such as Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States (US) and the Netherlands. 
Jakarta feared that Malaysia would cooperate with Britain to subvert Indonesia and that 
Washington would use the Philippines as a base to aid its old conquerors, the Dutch 
(Katanyuu 2006).
As direct oﬀ shoots of the Indonesian-Malaysian normalization talks concluding the 
confrontation period in 1966, the countries agreed that closer regional cooperation was 
necessary to prevent the recurrence of future confrontations. Indonesia was in fact the 
initiator of the idea for a new regional organization (Anwar 1994). Jakarta developed a 
draft  proposal that included the principles of non-interference, non-alignment and zero 
great-power competition, to avoid any future repeat of confrontational activities (Smith 
1999). In 1966-67, Indonesian diplomats toured several Southeast Asian countries to 
promote this idea, which successfully culminated with the establishment of ASEAN in 
1967. Finally, a decade aft er the establishment of ASEAN, the formalization of the TAC 
and its enshrinement of non-interference eﬀ ectively froze national boundaries of ASEAN 
countries as of 1976 (Anwar 1994).
This new association’s adherence to non-interference thus stems from its members’ 
histories of interstate disputes, internal subversion, and moves to secede.  Neighbours 
suspect each other of bolstering domestic ethnic groups to foment secession. In principle, 
criticism or interference provides avenues to aid insurgencies. Therefore, ASEAN’s 
founders believed that cooperation must stem from the ‘absence of external interference’ 
(Katanyuu 2006). Indonesia had an important additional reason for promoting non-
intervention. Indonesia’s positive participation in ASEAN was designed to undo the 
damage that confrontational phase had done to its reputation. The levels of violence 
of Indonesia’s confrontation in Malaysia had over-reached its earlier more acceptable 
concerns of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. As a result, it earned worldwide 
condemnation, leaving it internationally isolated (Anwar 1994). 
Non-Interference versus Flexible Engagement
Recently, however, some members have tried to distance themselves from this policy. 
The Thai proposal for ‘fl exible engagement’ in 1998 is a case in point, which promotes 
discussions of members’ domestic policies. The then-Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan 
held that issues aﬀ ecting each other might be brought up and discussed by members, 
without being perceived as interference. The proposal itself was not initially supported 
by other members, except the Philippines (with Indonesia and Malaysia being the most 
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vocal opponents), but debate over the interpretation of the principle of non-interference 
has continued (Katsumata 2004).
When Bangkok put forward its proposal, Indonesia’s then-Foreign Minister Ali Alatas 
voiced his disagreement as such: ‘non-interference is a very basic principle. We can talk 
about certain problems like transnational crimes, but if you start talking about how a 
country must run aﬀ airs like human rights or democratization, then you are gett ing 
into trouble’ (Katsumata 2004, pp. 250-251). He also warned that without this principle, 
Southeast Asia would regress to the pre-ASEAN confrontation days (Ramcharan 2000).
This should not be surprising; the Philippines and Thailand (notwithstanding periodic 
military coups) have relatively fewer domestic issues. This is shown in Freedom in the 
World, an annual assessment of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL). According to 
the assessment in 1998, the year in which the fl exible engagement was put forward, both 
the Philippines and Thailand were graded 2 (PR) and 3 (CL) out of 7, the lowest possible 
score. Indonesia’s scores were 6 (PR) and 4 (CL). It can be concluded that ASEAN countries 
that are considered authoritarian are concerned about the security of their regime, 
therefore they are opposed to a fl exible interpretation of non-interference (Katsumata 
2004). Indonesia is still politically ‘weak’ and in the process of nation-building. Thus, 
Indonesia would certainly fi nd it diﬃ  cult to accept any proposal for modifying the non-
intervention principle (Katsumata 2003). 
Non-Interference in Practice
The 1998 political turmoil in Indonesia provided a test-case for the sanctity of the non-
intervention principle in ASEAN. The reactions of the association’s members individually 
and collectively to the events that eventually led to Suharto’s ousting showed that 
the principle of non-interference was scrupulously adhered to by ASEAN members 
(Ramcharan 2000). However as time went on, oHoHdespite fl exible engagement not 
being oﬃ  cially recognized in ASEAN, some member countries have taken liberties. 
Indonesia never took kindly towards these occurrences. It responded coldly in 1998 when 
Singapore Mentor Minister Lee Kuan Yew criticized then-Indonesian President Suharto’s 
choice of Jusuf Habibie for vice-president (this being the fi rst direct criticism of Indonesia 
by the leader of another ASEAN country), and in 1999 when Singapore Prime Minister 
Goh Chook Tong called on Jakarta to hold elections that would be accepted as fair and 
legitimate by the Indonesian people (Katsumata 2004). 
The Megawati government gave Singapore a taste of its own medicine when it 
responded to Singapore’s demand for stronger action against terrorist suspects taking 
shelter in Indonesia by citing Indonesia’s ‘democratic political system’, which does not 
permit arbitrary arrests of the kind that Singapore’s International Security Act facilitates 
(Acharya 2003). Also in 2001, the then- President Abdurrahman Wahid warned ASEAN 
that dealing with the violence in Maluku, which between 1998 and 2001 left  about 5000 
people dead and displaced up to half a million, should be left  to Jakarta. Perhaps as a 
result of this, ASEAN as an association withheld from interfering in the East Timor issue, 
and instead participated in the United Nations (UN) backed intervention force only as 
individual states (Haacke 2003). ASEAN also practiced a hands-oﬀ  approach with the 
Aceh separatist movements (Solingen 2005). 
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However, what was perceived by Indonesia as being ‘interference’ continued to come 
from ASEAN states over the haze issue, which Indonesia principally considered a 
domestic problem. Simon Tay, a member of the Singapore Parliament, laid the blame for 
the fi res on the failure of the Indonesian system to enforce its laws (Ramcharan 2000). 
Also, Malaysia’s Environment Minister Azmi Khalid also called on Indonesia to impose 
the most severe penalties under the law on any plantation companies or farmers found 
responsible for the fi res, and urged Indonesia to quickly ratify the ATHP (Morning Star 
Online 8 October 2006). 
A SPECIAL CONCERN FOR SOVEREIGNTY
In June 2007, positive spirits within ASEAN were sullied when Jakarta indefi nitely 
delayed the approval of Singapore and Malaysia’s proposed plans of assistance for Jambi 
and Riau respectively, citing that it ‘will receive foreign assistance only on advice’ as it was 
concerned that ‘foreign aid could disturb its sovereignty’ (The Jakarta Post 18 June 2007). 
As of September 2007, both countries’ proposals are still up in the air (Tan & Mulchand 
21 August 2007).   
The defi ning characteristic of sovereignty is the state’s capacity to make authoritative 
decisions on the people and resources within its territory. The principle of sovereign 
equality is enshrined in Article 2, Section 1, of the United Nations (UN) Charter, and 
the corresponding norm of non-intervention in Article 2, Section 7: a sovereign state is 
empowered by international law to exercise exclusive and total jurisdiction within its 
territorial borders, and other states have the corresponding duty not to intervene in its 
internal aﬀ airs (Evans & Sahnoun 2002). 
Colonial History and Independence 
Indonesia, like most other ASEAN countries, had been under colonial rule until the 
middle of the twentieth century, with colonial powers using the country’s population and 
resources for their own means for many years. Due to this fact, the countries of Southeast 
Asia have always considered state sovereignty as an essential element of national security 
and stability. Even aft er independence, many of the ASEAN countries’ national security 
problems arose out of intervention or interference by outside powers in its aﬀ airs; for 
example the war in Indochina and the subsequent division of Southeast Asia between the 
communist bloc and the capitalist world. These interventions internalized and worsened 
local confl ict in these formative years. Moreover, Communist China has repeatedly 
att empted to ‘export’ the communist revolution to Southeast Asia by supporting 
insurgencies in the 1950s and 1960s (Katsumata 2003).
Departing from this common historical background, Indonesia’s take on independence 
and sovereignty was diﬀ erent from its neighbours’, due to  the legacy of the country’s 
long national struggle for independence, particularly through the revolutionary period 
of 1945-49, when the fl edgling republic fought a bloody war against the returning Dutch 
colonial power aft er the Japanese occupation. In contrast, Indonesia’s nearest neighbours, 
Malaysia and Singapore achieved their independence through formal agreements with 
the British and relatively litt le bloodshed. This fueled suspicion among Indonesian 
nationalists that these countries were risking their sovereignty and falling into a neo-
colonial trap, which led to the hostile confrontation period between Malaysia and 
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Indonesia in 1963-66. This nationalism, distrust of major powers, and a strong belief in 
itself have produced a tendency towards self reliance (Anwar 1994).
The IMF Experience
Indonesia’s experience with international assistance has also made it weary of losing 
control over its internal aﬀ airs. Socialized by institutions like the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) into believing that foreign capital is the strategic factor in development, most 
ASEAN countries liberalized their capital accounts and fi nancial sectors in the 1990s. 
With litt le regulation, foreign capital gravitated not to productive sectors like agriculture 
and manufacturing, but rather to the stock market, consumer fi nancing, and in particular, 
real estate. As a glut in real estate developed, borrowers became overloaded with non-
performing loans. By 1997, it was time to get out, and the liberalization of the capital 
account left  no mechanism to slow down the exit of foreign capital, resulting in currency 
crashes across the region (Bello 1999). 
Early in the crisis the Indonesian government att empted to defend its currency, using 
Central Bank reserves, and loosen its control on the exchange rate. However, declining 
reserves and collapsing fi nancial institutions forced it to accept an amazingly detailed 
and interventionist set of IMF conditions linked to a $43 billion bailout loan (Bullard, 
Bello & Mallhotra et al 1998). Thus, Indonesia lost its last shred of economic sovereignty 
(Bello 1999). 
Rather than restoring confi dence, the IMF directives caused a bank run, massive 
unemployment, soaring food prices, and social unrest (Bullard, Bello & Mallhotra 1998). 
In 1998, Indonesia’s economy contracted by 25%. People living in poverty increased from 
11.2% of the population to 60.6% (Bello 1999). In response, the Indonesian government 
went against IMF rules by putt ing the army in charge of food distribution in an att empt 
to regain control over its economy. However, top-level IMF oﬃ  cials immediately fl ew 
in to bully Indonesia into reaﬃ  rming its commitment to the IMF deal (Bullard, Bello & 
Mallhotra 1998). While other countries’ experience with the crisis varied, Indonesia, along 
with Thailand, were the most badly scarred in the region (Bello 1999). The IMF experience 
was a neo-colonial reminder that larger powers can take control of a desperate country’s 
sovereign activities through coercion, even in these modern times.
Territorial Tensions with Malaysia and Singapore
Indonesia has also had several experiences grappling with control over territorial 
sovereignty with both Malaysia and Singapore in recent times. In 2002, sovereignty over 
the Borneo Islands of Ligitan and Sipadan was decided by the International Court of 
Justice. The court found that sovereignty resided in Malaysia, not Indonesia. The dispute 
over these islands emerged in 1969, when both countries were in the initial stages of 
oﬀ shore petroleum exploration in the area and had begun to negotiate their continental 
shelf boundaries. Indonesia lost the case based on historical evidence that in 1962, aft er 
Indonesia’s independence, British colonial authorities in Malaysia established light towers 
on both Sipadan and Ligitan without objections from the Indonesian government. Despite 
this loss, maritime boundaries between Indonesia and Malaysia still remain unresolved 
at court. A similar earlier case was the legal batt le between the Philippines and Indonesia 
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for the Island of Palmas oﬀ  the Philippine border in 1928, which Indonesia narrowly won 
(Colson 2003).
With Singapore, sovereignty issues over the Riau islands of Batam and Bintan have 
not been so clear-cut. In the 1960s, Indonesia’s plans to enter into the high technology 
sectors gelled with Singapore’s desire to oﬀ set its increasingly high cost economy, and 
industrialization of the islands, which are located close to Singapore, began with the 
involvement of Singapore government-linked companies and capital. Now, the islands 
are a peculiar hybrid of Indonesian-Singaporean social order, and an anti-model for what 
it implies for the maintenance of a unitary Indonesian state. The Singapore government’s 
role in these islands have been raised as an election issue in Indonesia, and the islands 
stand to be set further apart from Jakarta by their inclusion in a Singapore-US free 
trade agreement in 2002, made possible by the lack of clear-cut rules on the limits of 
the Singaporean government’s involvement (Phelps 2004). Due to its archipelagic nature, 
Indonesia is especially open to legal territorial disputes, with every loss further whitt ling 
away its sovereign territory. 
Heterogeneity and Internal Confl ict 
Indonesian leaders are also very much aware of the country’s inherent weakness, which 
can limit the government’s control over its territory and population. Indonesia is still 
an industrially backward country with limited infrastructure and fi nancial means 
to eﬀ ectively link its entire people spread out over some 13,000 islands. Furthermore, 
because of the heterogeneity of the population, one can never take Indonesia’s national 
unity for granted, as shown by the various rebellions against the central government in 
the years following independence. These rebellions included an att empted communist 
coup in September 1948, a protracted military struggle to set up a separate Islamic state 
in the 1950s to the 1960s, early separatist movements such as the South Mollucan area, 
regional rebellions to show dissatisfaction with the central government in Sumatra and 
Sulawesi, and another att empted communist coup in 1965 (Anwar 1994).
Of late, more separatist movements have gained ground in outlying provinces. In 1999, 
East Timorese voted overwhelmingly for separation from Indonesia in a UN supervised 
balloting, and Jakarta ratifi ed this bloody divorce. Indonesians who opposed giving up 
East Timor feared a ‘domino eﬀ ect’ in which other provinces would follow East Timor 
out the door (Emmerson 2000). Indeed, Jakarta had had to make special deals to soothe 
the two other most independence-minded provinces of Aceh and Papua, granting them 
exceptions with the devolution of power to the provincial level (Smith 2004). Faced with 
various separatist att empts, full control over all activities within Indonesia’s borders 
become even more important to the central government. Many question whether the 
central government can hold Indonesia together and are worried that Indonesia is heading 
down a path towards disintegration (Smith 2004). 
Riau is an especially sensitive case, which can explain Indonesia’s reluctance to approve 
either country’s proposal. The Riau province is also on the lengthening list of potential 
defectors (Emmerson 2000). Singapore is already very economically involved in the Riau 
islands, and even includes them in its bilateral free trade agreements. Involvement by 
Malaysia in the province would further dilute the center’s control.
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DEALING WITH DECENTRALIZATION
With the ATHP still pending Indonesian ratifi cation, ASEAN was open to alternative 
solutions. This much needed alternative was seemingly provided in November 2006 
by Indonesia itself. Instead of the top-down ATHP with action initiated from ASEAN, 
Indonesia proposed a bott om-up approach, presenting its own National PoA to be adopted 
by ASEAN (Asmarani 22 November 2006). This PoA was formalized by ASEAN in March 
2007 (Channel NewsAsia 6 March 2007). Even though the plan was dubbed ‘adopt-a-
district’, countries could choose to assist provinces, regencies, or districts (Asmarani 
22 November 2006). As it happened, Singapore and Malaysia oﬀ ered assistance on the 
province level and in June 2007, both countries’ proposals of assistance for Jambi and 
Riau respectively were presented to Jakarta (Ghani 20 June 2007), both of which are still 
pending approval (Tan & Mulchand 21 August 2007).  
Tensions in all administrative levels in response to this policy can be seen aﬀ ecting 
Jakarta. In July 2007, President Yudhoyono angrily demanded that governors of fi re-
prone provinces treat anti-haze eﬀ orts more seriously (Ghani 19 June 2007). However, 
in July 2007, a new law was passed in Riau that permits land under two hectares to be 
cleared by fi re, which directly contradicts Jakarta’s goals of ending the slash-and-burn 
culture (Agence France Presse 3 July 2007). With the decentralization process already 
under much strain, it is understandable that any further devolvement of power to its 
lower hierarchies would make Jakarta nervous.
Politicians across Indonesia worked to loosen Jakarta’s infl uence over them since Suharto’s 
fall in 1998. In addition to more administrative powers, they also sought either greater 
control over their economies or larger transfers of resources from Jakarta, depending on 
the kind of resources within their borders. In response to these pressures, as well as the 
fear of national disintegration, the incoming President Habibie’s government passed a 
pair of landmark laws in April 1999 to decentralize political authority and fi scal resources 
to district governments (ISAS 2001).
The fi rst law grants district-level governments a broad range of rights, excluding only 
defense, foreign aﬀ airs, justice, religion, and monetary policy. The second law revamps 
the fi scal relationship between the central and regional governments to give the latt er 
greater autonomy over their own fi nances. For the fi rst time, the central government 
committ ed itself to share revenues derived from natural resource production with the 
regions in which the resources are produced. For instance, the regional government will 
be entitled to 80 percent of aft er-tax revenues from forestry resources (ISAS 2001).
Decentralization has been a major theme worldwide in recent years (Devas 1997), 
and a daunting task for any government. However, the unanticipated demise of the 
Suharto regime in ‘one of the most centralized countries in the world’ and the radical 
decentralization laws advanced Indonesia’s district government process extremely 
rapidly (Silver 2003). Thus, Jakarta is still in the process of ironing out the wrinkles of its 
increasingly problematic policy. 
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District versus Provinces
The oﬃ  cial reason for a district focus was that this level is ‘closest to the people’. However, it 
can be argued that the smaller hamlet, village, and traditional multi-village organizations 
are even ‘closer’ to them. Also, considerations of scale provide strong arguments for 
more provincial autonomy (for example, education and healthcare). The motivation for 
bypassing the province is likely to be that secessionist forces are more easily generated in 
the provinces. This was rarely acknowledged in public, but Bung Hatt a, a founder of the 
republic, did express this worry (Ferrazzi 2000). 
Singapore and Malaysia’s proposals to help out in selected provinces do not coincide with 
Indonesia’s carefully craft ed plan. Although the factors for this choice may seem merely 
functional (Jambi fi res blow haze to Singapore, and Riau similarly aﬀ ects Malaysia) 
(Mulchand 5 July 2007) this can be disruptive to Jakarta. Whether Jakarta’s decision to 
oﬀ er the choice between the diﬀ erent levels was an administrative mistake or a strategy 
for delay is unclear, but the signifi cance of Malaysia and Singapore picking provinces 
instead of districts, and Indonesia’s aversion to this, is not lost.
As previously discussed, Singapore is already very economically involved in the Riau 
Islands, even including them in its trade agreements (Phelps 2004). In what can be seen as 
a defensive move, the Riau Islands, once part of the Riau province, was given provincial 
status in 2003 (The Jakarta Post 14 August 2003), eﬀ ectively bringing control back to the 
center. This follows the logic of Indonesia’s decentralization strategy; to maintain control 
over provinces, while devolving power to its districts (Ferrazzi 2000). Now, Malaysia is 
proposing to assist the larger Riau province (Ghani 20 June 2007), the approval of which 
would further add to the vulnerability of this particular area to outside infl uences. 
It is noted that provincial power is limited as part of Indonesia’s decentralization 
strategy. Therefore, Indonesia technically should not have to worry about either country’s 
involvement on the provincial level. However, there have been continued political outcries 
across the archipelago for devolvement of power to the provincial level. Through sheer 
intransigence, provinces introduced uncertainty in decentralization initiatives, forcing the 
center to respond and adjust to their wants and circumstances. A good example would be 
the law was blatantly passed in Riau that permits land under two hectares to be cleared 
by fi re in July 2007, which directly contradicts Jakarta’s goals of ending the slash-and-
burn culture (Agence France Presse 3 July 2007).
Jakarta has already been pressured into giving special autonomy packages to several 
provinces. Aceh now claims 75 percent of natural resource revenues, and other provinces, 
including Riau, are eyeing similar deals; some threatening secession otherwise (Ferrazzi 
2000). Should Jakarta fall to these pressures and extend administrative and fi nancial 
autonomy, there will be very real danger of outside infl uences gaining foothold in the 
already unstable Riau area.
Decentralizing the Forests
It is commonplace for governments to prioritize their internal issues fi rst, before 
international or regional ones. For instance, Indonesia largely withdrew from regional 
activities beginning from the 1997 fi nancial crisis to concentrate on rebuilding its economy, 
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at the expense of its ad hoc ASEAN leadership (Ganesan 2004). Likewise now, Jakarta’s 
decentralization eﬀ orts are currently not only distracted by demands from provinces, but 
by tensions in districts as well. 
Within the process of decentralization, forest management is an especially important 
issue for Jakarta. While the oil sector was the focus of Indonesia’s development strategy 
in the 1960-70s, the decline of oil production, drop in global oil prices, and governmental 
mismanagement practically bankrupted Indonesia in the mid-1970s. Therefore, in the 
late 1970s, Jakarta shift ed its development focus to the forestry sector (Ascher 1998). It 
steadily contributed around 20% to Indonesia’s yearly Gross Domestic Product, opened 
up inaccessible areas to development, employed people, evolved communities, supported 
related industries, and created the necessary conditions for socioeconomic development 
(Gellert 2005). The forestry sector continues to mold the state and infl uence the policy-
making environment (Ascher 1998).
The transition for control over forestry resources has not been smooth, with power 
struggles between the central Ministry of Forestry and districts. Among other examples 
is the issue of small-scale logging licenses. In the past, a Ministerial decree in 2000 had 
authorized district governments to grant small-, medium- and large-scale logging licenses. 
Soon realizing the consequences, the Ministry revoked this decree in 2002. However, 
the regions ignored the decree and continued giving out small-scale licenses, as these 
activities generate substantial revenues for district governments, by introducing new 
fees including third-party contributions (a one-time fee, usually based on the size of the 
concession), and a ‘retribution’ fee based on volume of timber harvested (Resosudarmo 
2004). 
In June 2002, the government produced an implementing regulation, which swings all 
authority for forests back to the center. However, district governments strongly opposed 
the regulation. Confusion over hierarchy has brought the Ministry to admit that it is 
losing authority over the forests: district governments now reject its orders and laws. 
Administratively, districts are not subordinate to the Ministry of Forestry but rather to 
the Ministry of Home Aﬀ airs. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Forestry’s eﬀ orts to gain the 
Ministry of Home Aﬀ airs’ approval to impose sanctions on defi ant district governments 
have not been successful (Resosudarmo 2004). The government has been reduced to 
merely verbally reprimanding district governors for not being serious about anti-haze 
eﬀ orts (Ghani 19 June 2007).
If a country has domestic issues the government does not want to expose to international 
criticism, it becomes reluctant to promote collective endeavors. Other countries’ 
interference might restrict domestic policy options to deal with such issues (Katsumata 
2004). Should Malaysia and Singapore’s proposals be approved, fi rstly, Jakarta will have 
to pay closer att ention to these provinces. Secondly, forestry management, which is 
currently being grappled between districts and the central Ministry, will now involve the 
provinces as well. Although the details of either country’s plans of assistance have not yet 
been publicly released, an omen in the form of a detail of Singapore’s plan was discussed 
in the media. Its proposal to get global experts on peatland management to help Jambi, 
with possible funding from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (Channel NewsAsia 21 
June 2007) was fl agged by Jakarta, as it already has a bilateral agreement with the ADB 
and related central laws (Ghani 20 June 2007). 
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A ONCE AND FUTURE LEADER?
Indonesia’s position in the ASEAN haze equation shift ed rather dramatically during the 
observed one year timeframe. Coming into the region-wide revival of anti-haze eﬀ orts in 
October 2006, various ASEAN countries were pressuring Indonesia into quickly ratifying 
the ATHP (Morning Star Online 8 October 2006). At this time, the seemingly humbled and 
docile republic announced that it was seriously considering ratifi cation (The Jakarta Post 
10 October 2006).
The beginnings of this shift  could be detected in November 2006 when Indonesia proposed 
its own National PoA to have ASEAN countries to adopt and help its fi re-prone areas 
(Straits Times 2 November 2006) (this PoA was formalized on the ASEAN level in March 
2007) (Channel NewsAsia 6 March 2007). Also, in December 2006, the ratifi cation of the 
ATHP was halted indefi nitely in the Indonesian parliament (Asmarani 13 December 
2006). Indonesia’s aggressive position was further solidifi ed in May 2007 when Indonesian 
oﬃ  cials questioned the necessity of the treaty (Teo 17 May 2007). Indonesia also att empted 
to shift  responsibility back to ASEAN by playing victim and stating that members should 
commit themselves to helping Jakarta combat illegal logging in return for ratifi cation 
(Osman 12 May 2006). 
As of June 2007, Indonesia was clearly not considering taking instructions for ASEAN 
any longer. It announced that it would receive foreign assistance only on advice (The 
Jakarta Post 18 June 2007), and proposals from Singapore and Malaysia as part of the 
‘adopt-a-district’ program remain unapproved by the central government (Ghani 20 June 
2007). The status of ratifi cation of the ATHP remains unencouraging; Indonesia vaguely 
stated in August 2007 that it may ratify the treaty ‘maybe next year’ (Tan & Mulchand 21 
August 2007). By fi rst gett ing its own National PoA adopted by ASEAN, delaying ATHP 
ratifi cation, and fi nally deeming other members responsible for its illegal logging (and 
hence the haze) problem, Indonesia is clearly trying to take the reins of the haze issue on 
the ASEAN level. 
Indonesians are very conscious of their country’s importance in the region. This pride 
stemmed from the fact that Indonesia is the largest and most populous country in the 
region; it is rich in natural resources; it is strategically located amidst two great oceans; 
and it controls key sea passages for maritime traﬃ  c. Its long and glorious historical 
past, especially of the great empires of Srivĳ aya and Majapahit which spanned vast 
territories beyond the Archipelago; its rich cultural tradition; and its heroic nationalist 
struggle, also gave Indonesians moral superiority over other nations that obtained their 
independence through peaceful means (Anwar 1994). From the beginning, Indonesia 
took a leading role in the composition of the  proposed regional organization. Within 
ASEAN, Indonesia continued to stress non-interference, non-alignment and removing 
great-power competition from the region, which later became ASEAN’s doctrines (Smith 
1999). Indonesia also houses the ASEAN secretariat (Ganesan 2004). 
During the later Suharto period, Jakarta had assumed an implicit leadership position 
within ASEAN (NZIR 2000). Indeed, Indonesia has had a marked impact on the formation 
of, and developments within, ASEAN (Smith 1999). For example, at the end of the Cold 
War, Indonesia played a crucial role in organizing United Nations-supervised elections 
and normalizing relations with Cambodia and Vietnam. However, While ASEAN was 
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active in such co-ordination of policy towards a these countries, positive integration 
measures have been slow. This also refl ected Indonesia’s infl uence within ASEAN, 
which favoured regional resilience but resisted functional integration in favour of non-
interference (Smith 1999).  Indonesia also att empted to broker the Cambodia impasse, 
albeit unsuccessfully with the Jakarta Informal Meetings in 1998; it played a honest broker 
in the disputed Spratly territorial claims between China and ASEAN members in the 
1990s; and brokered the truce between the Philippines and the Moro National Liberation 
Front in 1996 (Ganesan 2004).
Indonesia, despite being a medium power in terms of traditional determinants like land 
area and population size, gains signifi cantly from enhanced leverage as the association’s 
‘leader’. Indonesia’s elites cite fi ve major political functions provided by ASEAN. Firstly, 
ASEAN helps preserve regional harmony through its non-interference doctrine. Indonesia 
believed that with close association and leadership within ASEAN, the other members 
would become more aware of Indonesia’s relatively greater size and clout, which would 
enhance its infl uence over issues important to Indonesia like non-intervention and non-
alignment (Anwar 1994).
Secondly, ASEAN serves as a buﬀ er for Indonesia’s national security, with a ‘ring 
of friendship’ around it. Thirdly, ASEAN assists its aspiration in developing a more 
autonomous regional order as part of its non-alignment policy. Fourthly, ASEAN enhances 
its international credibility. As leader, Indonesia would carry more weight in international 
forums (Anwar 2004). Finally, ASEAN is useful as an international bargaining tool (Anwar 
1994). , ASEAN is oft en utilized as a collective bloc to further members’ agendas, from 
the export commodity prices to tariﬀ  reduction. In the global environment mediated by 
multilateral regimes, regional groupings have signifi cantly more leverage than individual 
states (Ganesan 2004). While states have diverse goals, a lead representative of a bloc 
would have signifi cant negotiation benefi ts. Thus, Indonesia sought regional leadership 
to achieve its foreign policy goals (Suliman 1997).
Downfall 
Indonesia adhered to its claim to lead the region until the collapse of the Suharto 
government in May 1998 aft er the fi nancial crisis hit. The political turbulence and rapid 
regime changes in post-Suharto Indonesia did not foster the conditions required for 
regional leadership (Ganesan 2004). In light of these problems and associated domestic 
economic restructuring, Indonesia became considerably more introverted, forced to deal 
with domestic agendas rather than regional ones. Its relations with other ASEAN members 
also deteriorated. Illegal migration of Indonesians to Malaysia caused serious tensions. 
Piracy and the regional haze from its forest fi res have led to considerable disquiet in 
Singapore and Malaysia. Terrorism and the discovery of transnational terrorist cells in 
Southeast Asia also caused regional frustration at Jakarta’s slow response in apprehending 
its nationals accused of leadership and complicity in such activities (Ganesan 2004). The 
current racial tensions within Indonesia have also brought to surface a disturbing anti-
Chinese element which has damaged its relations with Singapore (Smith 1999).
Indonesia’s recent political and economic upheavals have had major implications for 
ASEAN. Even the principle of non-interference in the domestic aﬀ airs other members, 
one of Indonesia’s main ideologies propagated within ASEAN, is being watered down. 
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Indonesia sits on the sidelines, still important but no longer able to lead ASEAN in a 
certain direction (NZIR 2000). Open comment on other ASEAN countries is commonplace. 
‘Flexible engagement’, although not oﬃ  cially endorsed by all, can be argued to be in 
practice. For example, regional monitoring of forest fi res and economic policies has 
created the opportunity of input from ASEAN member states (Smith 1999).
Reasserting Leadership
There is no obvious successor for the leadership role, but Thailand has been particularly 
active in promoting a modifi cation to the ASEAN way of conduct with ‘fl exible 
engagement’. However, Indonesia’s expectations and aspirations of regional leadership 
remain undiminished (Smith 1999). For example, the Indonesian scholar Hadi Soesastro 
had stated that ‘everyone looks to Indonesia as the only country that can revive the 
organization’. He asserts that ASEAN is in trouble because it has grown too large too fast, 
and in the current economic climate is of litt le interest to foreign investors (CSIS 2002); it 
desperately needs a leader.
Att empts to reassert Indonesia’s leadership can be observed since the ascendancy of 
Megawati Sukarnoputri to the presidential post in 2001, as Indonesia fi nally began to 
gather momentum towards total economic recovery. In fact, one of Megawati’s fi rst 
concerns as president was to restore relations with her neighbours, and her fi rst visits 
were to ASEAN countries. This may be att ributed to nostalgia for her gather’s grand 
history within ASEAN (CSIS 2002), however this concern has been mirrored by her 
successor, President Yudhoyono. 
Indonesia has also been named China’s initiator of choice for the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF), an important dialogue body including ASEAN, China, Japan, Korea and the US 
(CSIS 2002), further reasserting its infl uence within ASEAN. Other recent important 
initiatives include leading two of the four fl agship projects (disaster management and open 
source) under the ASEAN Plan of Action on Science and Technology 2007-11 (Bernama 
28 August 2007), blocking a US proposal to stop the spread of nuclear weapons during 
the ARF meeting in Manila in August 2007 because it did not include eﬀ orts towards 
disarmament (Khalik 3 August 2007), proposing that ASEAN draft  a declaration to support 
and implement all UNFCCC 2007 agreements (LKBN Antara 20 September 2007), and 
hosting the fi rst ever ASEAN-China Conference on Counterfeit Drugs in November 2007 
(Shankland 15 November 2007). In the same month, at the ASEAN Summit in Singapore, 
President Yudhoyono also announced that he wanted to lead regional anti-corruption 
eﬀ orts (BBC 30 November 2007).
During regional haze discussions, Malaysia and Singapore tended to take the lead, 
with their position as ‘victims’ of the crisis. Malaysia, especially, was confi dent enough 
to vocally condemn Indonesia for its lack of action. However, Indonesia is now trying 
to redefi ne the problem and reassign the victim status to itself, thus justifying its new 
aggressive stance. Indonesia even managed to get ASEAN to oﬃ  cially adopt its National 
PoA and push the ATHP into the background, eﬀ ectively handing over control of the 
issue to Indonesia. If Indonesia is able to continue asserting its power in such important 
ASEAN issues, it will be able to reclaim its perceived rightful regional leadership position. 
More importantly, Indonesia will be able to more strongly promote the non-interference 
principle this is especially important to Indonesia now, at a time where it does not need 
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outside interference with its current problematic decentralization process and forest 
management. 
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, Indonesia’s reactions during the period of October 2006 and September 
2007 in response to regional-level discussions and activities concerning the Southeast 
Asian haze was in fact an extension of its larger regional position as a strong proponent of 
the importance of the ASEAN norm of non-intervention. A renewed leadership position 
would enable it to, among other things, use its infl uence to reassert the practice of non-
interference within the region, leaving it to deal with the management of its forests and 
the haze domestically, and to complete its delicate decentralization process. 
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Fig. 1: The extent of the haze during the peak of the 2006 crisis (MSD 2006)
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